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KNOWING ME, KNOWING YOU: 





The paradox in the industrial district model is understanding how the divergent tendencies of local 
competition and cooperation are mediated. Social network are said to provide mechanisms that 
regulate inter-firm relations and facilitate the flow of knowledge within the confines of the district. 
Empirical evidence of this, particularly from the South, is limited. This paper draws on the case of the 
export-oriented surgical instrument cluster of Sialkot in Pakistan. It shows how social networks, based 
on kinship, family and localness, influence production relations, and how the impact of these 
interlinked local social networks have changed over time. The economic and social reputation that 
comes from being local is central to vertical and horizontal inter-firm relations within the cluster. 
Building social and economic ties with external agents is, however, also becoming important, 
especially to acquire the technical know-how necessary to remain competitive in global markets.  
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1  Introduction 
Industrial districts attract attention for their potential to generate agglomeration economies and 
encourage local collective action. These gains of clustering, captured by Schmitz (1995b) in the 
concept of collective efficiency, are put forward as being critical to the competitiveness of small and 
medium enterprise (SME) in both the North and the South (Schmitz 1992; Sengenberger and Pyke 
1991). The paradox in this model of industrial organisation has been understanding how the divergent 
tendencies of local competition and cooperation are mediated. The dominant view is that economic 
relations are, to use Granovetter's (1985) terms, 'socially embedded'. Thus, Becattini describes an 
industrial district as ‘a socio-territorial entity ...[where]... community and firms tend to merge’ 
(Becattini 1990:  38). Social ties between local agents are said to provide the basis for trust in 
economic relations (Dei Otatti 1994; Humphrey and Schmitz 1996). In addition, social capital, 
reflected in local civic traditions and community norms, is said to facilitate cooperative behaviour 
(Bazan and Schmitz 1997; Putnam 1993). This emphasis on trust, social capital and the overall social 
milieu has been a core and recurrent theme in the contemporary literature on industrial districts.2 
However, empirical evidence on how such factors influence economic behaviour within industrial 
clusters and districts in the developing world remains limited. 
In part this is because the concepts of trust and social capital have proven difficult to unpackage, and 
even more difficult to empirically capture (Humphrey and Schmitz 1996; Putnam 1993; Zucker 
1986). Clearly, they are not identical. As Zucker (1986) shows, trust ties can exist between actors who 
are socially unrelated to each other. Similarly, social capital does not necessarily imply bonds of trust. 
The key issue is understanding how local cooperation takes place, and, whether social ties, and the 
networks they engender, help explain how cooperative behaviour is brought about and how it 
develops. Whether such social ties result in trust within the district, and if so how they function, 
become subjects for empirical study.  
This paper, using evidence from Pakistan, shows how social networks can influence, and be changed 
by, the workings of an industrial district. The stainless steel surgical instruments industry of Sialkot is 
not only a global player in its niche sector, it is also marked by a thick web of social ties through 
which most local firms are related. The industry is made up of some 300, mainly small and medium 
sized, producers. These are supported by over 1,500 specialised subcontractors and a further 1,000 
odd suppliers and ancillary service units. This cluster of local producers is estimated to account for 
some 20 per cent of world exports, making it the second largest exporter, after Germany, of stainles 
steel surgical instruments (Nadvi 1996). Elsewhere I have discussed how this cluster has managed to 
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grow and compete in global markets (Nadvi 1997). Here, I explore how local social ties impact on 
economic relations within the cluster. 
According to one local entrepreneur social ties are unimportant. Instead, ‘in this business it is 
everyone for themselves’ (M. Moeed 13 February 1994).3 Another manufacturer, a second cousin and 
brother-in-law of the first, seconds this view, observing that in Sialkot ‘business is business and 
family is family’ (M. Sami 22 February 1994). These views, while capturing the intense local rivalry, 
are, however, puzzling. Most firms are family-run enterprises. Many entrepreneurs are related, either 
directly or through marriage, to each other. A large number of producers trace their family history in 
this activity back at least three generations. Most have grown up with each other in the town, played 
in the same streets and studied at the same local schools and colleges. Everyone knows everyone else 
in Sialkot. Knowing, and being known by, others is important to the survival and prosperity of local 
firms and ancillary units. Hence the paper's title. Knowing each other has both social and economic 
funtions, providing access to reputational information and channels for the flow of various types of 
knowledge. With such a thick web of locally embedded social relationships how then can it be said 
that ‘in business it is everyone for themselves’? This remark masks a more complicated reality, one in 
which local rivalry sits side-by-side and is intermeshed with close social ties. 
Social networks can have an important impact on the workings of local firms. They can provide a 
basis for regulating inter-firm relations, thereby mediating local competition and cooperation, and 
facilitate the historical sedimentation of 'tacit', sector-specific, knowledge. It has to be remembered, 
however, that social networks are not set in stone. They change with time, both in their characteristics 
and their influence. In the context of industrial districts, it has been argued that the basis of trust shifts 
from being socially 'ascribed' to being 'earned' in business (Schmitz, 1995a).4 Sociologists refer to this 
process by contrasting the notion of Gemeinschaft (community) with Gesellschaft (society).5 The 
former refers to a social solidarity built upon affective ties as part of a common kinship group or 
community identity. The latter suggests a solidarity group ‘based upon a division of labour and 
contractual relations between isolated individuals consulting their own individual self-interests’ 
(Bullock et al. 1988:  348).  
My proposition is that Sialkot's surgical instrument cluster draws strength from being embedded in 
local social networks. In evaluating this proposition, further questions are raised. What are the 
dominant forms of local social ties? How do social networks influence inter-firm relations? And, 
finally, how are social networks changing as the cluster itself evolves? With respect to change, I  
                     
3 To respect confidentiality, names of all firms and respondents have been changed. 
4 Marshall (1919:164-5) also talks of this. According to him as communities grew in size, ‘trust became less 
habitual and instinctive. In other words life became in some degree “business like”'.  
5 This distinction was first developed by Tönnies in 1887 (cited in Loomis and Beagle 1957). 
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argue that the binary notions of gemeinschaft-gesellschaft do not fully capture Sialkot's reality. While 
network ties are changing, I argue that the influence of local social identities remain important and 
continue to exert an influence on the workings of Sialkot's surgical instruments sector. Nevertheless, 
as Barr (1996) has observed, networks that serve to regulate contracts may not be as effective in 
facilitating information flows. Thus, as the sector develops, so the functional demands placed upon 
local social networks, and therefore the patterns of dominant social linkages, alter. 
The next section discusses how social networks can influence productive behaviour within the 
industrial district setting. Section 3 provides an introduction to Sialkot's surgical instruments industry. 
Section 4 identifies, and locates, the key categories of social identity in Sialkot. Section 5 uses 
primary data to explore how social networks influence inter-firm relations. The concluding section 
considers how social networks are changing as production relations in the Sialkot cluster develop. 
 
2  Social ties and networks:  cooperation, trust and embeddedness in industrial districts 
Inter-firm cooperation, at both vertical and horizontal levels, is central to production organisation 
within the industrial district. Specialised division of labour facilitates vertical subcontracting, while 
firms can also collaborate bilaterally (through, for example, consortia) and multilaterally (through 
trade associations). Such vertical and horizontal cooperation generates significant potential benefits to 
local producers. It also requires, as Richardson (1972:  895) notes, a ‘distinct method of co-
ordination.’ This can either be through the market; via a set of authority relations, such as Ouchi's 
(1980) treatment of the concept of clans; or involve a more 'egalitarian' basis of co-ordination. If the 
last option is pursued, mechanisms for building confidence between agents become necessary to offset 
the threat of the transaction costs arising from insufficient information, the fear of adverse selection, 
moral hazards and opportunistic behaviour. 
Confidence can develop when agents engage in long-term and recurring contracts and become 
familiar with each other. Networks offer an organisational form, distinct from Williamson's construct 
of markets and the integrated firm, where opportunism can be mitigated. At the heart of network 
relations is interdependency, with long-term, reciprocal, and mutually supportive relationships 
(Powell 1990). This requires a high degree of ‘mutual orientation’ between networked agents 
(Johanson and Mattson 1987:  39). Interdependence also implies that the threat of opportunism is 
diminished by the sanction of reciprocity. The fact that contracts are recurring, and long-term, 
provides insurance against 'malfeasance'. The reputation of each party is continuously and 
consistently at stake in each transaction with other agents in the network.  
Goodwill, reciprocity, and reputation are the basis on which long-term interdependent ties are built, 
and the grounds on which trust takes shape between cooperating parties within a network. However, 
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acquiring mutual knowledge and building reputation takes time. Network ties that are grounded in 
existing social relationships, wherein economic reputation is socially influenced, minimise such 
costs.6 In long-term contracts, trust and reputation effects are constructed on ties that are economic 
and business-like as well as personalised and social. Economic agents are individuals who are also 
connected through social ties. The importance of the social embeddedness approach is that it provides 
a basis for addressing how cooperation can be achieved, and the fear of opportunism minimised by 
local agents. Socio-cultural identities and characteristics influence, and are influenced by, intra and 
inter-firm relations within the cluster. Production networks in industrial districts are embedded in 
local social networks that carry with them various forms of social capital (Grabher 1993). These 
include socialised value sets, rules and mores which directly and indirectly influence the way in which 
production organisation within the district is organised, and socially constructed technical and 
community knowledge banks which can affect how the district develops.  
The embeddedness approach does not, however, imply social or cultural determinism. Social ties and 
social norms are not fixed in time. Quite the opposite, they are evolving processes. Constantly and 
consistently being shaped by economic and technical developments upon which they are themselves 
acting (Granovetter 1992:  57). At the same time socio-cultural value sets do not necessarily act in a 
predictable or homogeneous fashion on all segments of the cluster. They can legitimise exploitative 
practices, hinder cooperation between different segments of a cluster, and reinforce existing power 
asymmetries.7 By acting as barriers to entry of outsiders, social networks can also intensify prevalent 
social and regional inequities. If the cluster is not sufficiently large, restricting outsiders can also 
potentially limit cluster growth by limiting the pool of skills and capital that could be drawn upon. 
Finally, local social values and historically sedimented traditional technical knowledge can hinder and 
restrict the spread of new ideas from the outside. Thus, an inward-looking and homogeneous culture 
can make local agents more vulnerable to exogenous pressures, and ‘strongly embedded regional 
networks [can] insidiously turn from ties that bind to ties that blind’ (Grabher 1993:  24).  
In the industrial districts literature, social ties are multiple and varied. They form around notions of 
family, caste, ethnic, racial, religious, educational, political or corporate backgrounds. In the industrial 
districts of northeastern Italy, the family, the church and local political affiliations are said to provide 
a basis for social ties (Becattini 1990; Trigilia 1990). Where they have been observed in the South, 
notions of community shaped by religion, ethnicity, language, occupational caste or regional 
                     
6 The classic example is the gem trade, where community, ethnic, religious and family ties often provide the key 
mechanisms to minimise security costs and the threat of opportunistic behaviour (see Ben-Porath 1980; 
Coleman 1988; Raub and Weesie 1991, Scott 1995).  
7 Knorringa (1995) describes how religiously sanctioned caste prejudices restrict technical exchanges between 
tanners, shoemakers, and market agents in Agra's shoe cluster. Smyth and Kapadia (1995) show, in the context 
of clusters, how social norms can reinforce gender exploitation. 
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background have tended to be the primary form of local social identity.8 However, there is also 
evidence of more 'modern' social networks, based on shared educational or business experience (Cho 
1992; Holmström 1993, 1994; Schmitz 1995a).  
Thus, what we know from the existing literature is that social embeddedness can influence the 
workings of a district and its institutional framework in three ways. First, through the ‘sedimentation 
of specific and interrelated historical, social and cultural factors in local areas which generate 
significantly different processes of development directly due to local specifications’ (Garofoli 1992:  
3). This includes local religious and/or cultural attitudes that influence the the dominant work ethos, 
and support intra and inter-firm relations. 
Second, through social ties and socialised production relations that lower transaction costs by 
providing a basis for trust, social reputation, and reciprocity in inter-firm relations. Being socially 
embedded within a community provides a basis for the social provisioning of market-related 
information, and generates an implicit code of behaviour, incorporating rules and sanctions, that 
regulate both social and production relations within the cluster. Hence, a regulatory mechanism for 
inter-firm relations emerges from within community and socio-cultural identities. Sanctions enforce 
the limits of socially accepted commercial behaviour within firms and between firms. The ultimate 
sanction implies social exclusion from the community.9 A less draconian, yet effective, sanction in 
business relations is loss of reputation. A reputation for honesty and fairness in business transactions 
is highly valued and is constructed over an extensive period of time. Such a reputation is also 
zealously guarded. Where the social and commercial ‘exit costs’ (a la Hirschman) incurred from 
breaking a commitment are sufficiently high, reputational effects can serve to reinforce inter-firm 
cooperation.  
Third, through the social milieu which influences, and is itself influenced by, innovation and 
technological change. In the industrial district perspective, technology is endogenised, or related 
directly to the social fabric in which it is located. This has two important implications. First, clusters 
of small firms carry with them an element of ‘tacit knowledge’ regarding technology, skills, products 
and processes that is often specific to that community and usually accumulates over an extended 
historical period. Second, innovation and technical progress is an incremental and 'systemic' (as 
opposed to 'atomistic') process which builds upon interactions between users and producers (Lundvall 
1988). Such interactive technical co-operation requires commonly accepted codes of behaviour, 
channels of information, and mutual trust (Lundvall 1988:  352-4). 
                     
8 See Nadvi and Schmitz 1994 for a review of the material on social ties in Southern industrial districts. 
9 As Marshall (1919:164) stated ‘business trust and confidence...were indeed enforced within each group by the 
social penalty of ostracism: an offender against his neighbours became an outcast, often without refuge.’ 
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What we do not know, however, is the actual details of how social networks function in an industrial 
district context. Even though social embeddedness is much talked about, there are few empirical 
studies that document how social ties influence economic behaviour in industrial districts, and even 
fewer studies on the social networks of producers in the South who compete in the markets of the 
North. In trying to fill this gap, this paper seeks to understand how dominant social identities in the 
Sialkot cluster influence vertical and horizontal inter-firm relations. In particular, our concern is with 
how social networks reduce transaction costs and facilitate information and knowledge flows. And 
the paper explores how the dominant social identities within the cluster are themselves changing.  
Before turning to the case study, a caveat has to be noted. Many of the social characteristics, 
community attributes, and moral codes that derive from social ties are not directly observable. 
Members of a community often internalise social identities and their associated properties without 
being consciously aware of it. Hence, discerning the role of social embeddedness is more difficult 
than the relatively perceptible patterns of inter-firm production relations. 
 
3  Sialkot and its surgical instruments industry - A brief sketch 
Sialkot's surgical instruments cluster has deep local roots. The 1895 District Gazetteer mentions metal 
forging and manufacture of metal utensils in the region. It particularly notes the skill of Sialkot's 
ironsmiths to produce high quality ornamental damascening and inlay work, and their ability to repair 
and manufacture ‘large quantities of caskets, shields... swords, spear-heads, gurkha knives, razors, 
stirrups’ to an excellent degree of workmanship.10 The transition to surgical instrument making came 
in the 1890s, as a consequence of the demand for repair, and subsequently manufacture, of surgical 
implements created by the presence of a local Mission hospital. The birth of the sector, including, the 
‘accidental’ association between the hospital and local ironsmiths, was thus linked to the presence of 
specialist knowledge among local artisans of how to forge, fashion, shape and produce metal 
implements to a high degree of precision.  
Once the transition to producing surgical instruments was made, there was a slow but systematic 
growth in the industry during the first quarter of the 20th century. From catering initially to the 
demand of local hospitals, Sialkot's fledgling surgical instrument producers had by 1920 expanded to 
supplying much of the Indian market and to make forays into regional exports (Pakistan Surgical 
Instruments Buyers Guide 1992-3, p.68). Two exogenous shocks in the 1940s significantly boosted 
the sector's growth. World War Two brought Sialkot into the war effort, becoming an important 
supplier of surgical instruments. Technology, design blueprints, drawings, know-how and technical 
                     
10 Cited in the Gazetteer of Sialkot District 1920, p.124-5, p127. Sialkot's reputation for metalworking, 
particularly weaponry manufacture dates to the early Mughal period. 
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experts were brought in from Britain, and a technical support institute set up in 1941 to assist local 
industry. The second shock came with the partitioning of British India and the independence of 
Pakistan in 1947. Despite the widescale communal violence and the chaotic process of building a new 
state, Partition generated new spaces for productive activity. It resulted in the exodus of the minority 
Hindu community from Sialkot. Although production was largely the preserve of Muslim artisans, the 
Hindu community played a key role as traders and financiers.11 Their departure, while creating a 
vacuum, provided space for new opportunities for Muslim traders and artisans to step in.  
Despite momentary setbacks, the cluster's growth has been rapid. Export revenues have risen nearly 
twenty fold in real terms since 1960 and currently exceed US$ 125 million. Today, the cluster 
manufactures over 2,000 different types of stainless steel instruments used in all branches of 
medicine, surgery, dentistry, and veterinary work. Some instruments are custom-made and single 
purpose, others are differentiated by function, end users, size and metal composition. The bulk of 
exports go to the United States (59 per cent of total export volume) and the European Community (27 
per cent). A significant proportion of these are further re-exported by foreign buyers under their own 
brand names. In addition, Sialkot's firms also undertake subcontractual tasks for foreign, particularly 
German, manufacturers. 
At the core of the cluster are some 300 registered manufacturers, the vast majority of which employ 
less than twenty workers.12 The ability to neatly 'dismember' production into separable process-
specific stages, based on a clear demarcation of skills and technologies, allows for the presence of 
over 1500 specialised subcontractors. These undertake tasks such as die-making, forging, filing, 
polishing, grinding, machining, electroplating, and heat treatment. In addition, there are numerous 
local specialised suppliers of stainless steel, new and used machinery, chemicals, polishing belts, 
abrasives, grinding material, files, as well as marketing agents, service units and support institutions. 
Among export related support services there are over a hundred customs clearing agents as well as 
travel agents, insurance agents, cargo handlers, and international couriers. A few public and private 
sector institutions, including the trade association, a technology support centre, and a privately-run 
dry port also provide services to the cluster.  
Sialkot presents a picture of sharp contrasts. Despite being the ‘city of exporters’ it has none of the 
attributes of an export centre. There is neither an airport nor an international standard hotel. 
Nevertheless, it is a relatively wealthy town. for example, wage rates exceed the national average, 
while local industrialists live in large marble fronted houses and drive the latest air-conditioned cars. 
Yet, such wealth is not reflected in Sialkot's civic amenities or social services. Thus, while Sialkot's  
                     
11 For example, of the five registered surgical instrument firms in Sialkot at Partition, three were Hindu owned.  
12 Based on Surgical Instrument Manufacturers Association (SIMA) Membership lists; FBS, Census of 
Manufacturing Industries 1987-88, Census of Small and Household Manufacturing Industries 1988 
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skyline is dotted with satellite dishes, many of its congested neighbourhoods lack adequate drainage 
and sanitation. The Sialkot cluster itself is highly differentiated, with large and medium scale 
manufacturers at one end and smaller producers, subcontractors and waged workers at the other. 
Neverthless, cross-cutting social identities often dilute the sense of duality. Most firms are family 
units and many extended families have large and small producers in their midst. Workers, artisans and 
subcontractors walk in and out of the offices of firm owners while the latter spend a substantial 
amount of their time on the shop floor in technical discussions with workers and subcontractors. This 
element of interfacing is helped by the close proximity of producers to vendors. In the towns' 
industrial areas, medium and large firms making sophisticated precision instruments are surrounded 
by countless small, open-fronted, process specific workshops. In many areas the boundaries between 
residential and manufacturing space are indeterminate with whole neighbourhoods engaged in some 
aspect of the industry.  
Key production relationships for local firms include vertical ties with subcontractors and external 
buyers and loose horizontal links with other producers, particularly through the trade association.13 
Vertical ties tend to be long-standing with most firms having dealt with the same subcontractors and 
buyers for an average of over ten years. There is also variation. Small and medium sized firms are 
more dependent upon subcontractors than larger firms. In addition, subcontractual ties are particularly 
important in processes considered quality critical - such as forging, filing, heat treatment and 
polishing. Most firms regularly assist subcontractors engaged in these activities, especially through 
detailed discussions and technical feedback on manufacturing processes, product quality and 
production organisation. Subcontractors can also become conduits for technical knowledge and 
developments within the cluster, especially for smaller producers. Increasingly, however, the key tie 
for all manufacturers, are their links with external buyers. Ties with buyers are important in obtaining 
technical information and helping local producers face new competitive challenges, such as recent 
pressures to meet international quality assurance requirements. Most firms in Sialkot consider external 
clients as a leading source for technical and marketing information. Some have developed their 
technical capacity and product lines through active collaboration with foreign buyers. A few local 
firms have even entered into joint venture partnerships with the leading German manufacturers in the 
industry.  
Most firms in Sialkot consider other local producers to be their leading competitors. Competition can 
be aggressive, over prices, the poaching of clients and strategically valuable information. Despite 
local rivalry there is evidence of horizontal cooperation. Local entrepreneurs exchange production 
related ideas and discuss common problems with each other. Occasionally such discussions take place 
within the trade association. More often they occur informally. Other collaborative initiatives by local 
                     
13 For a detailed discussion of production and trade ties within the Sialkot cluster, see Nadvi 1996, 1997. 
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firms include the setting up of the dry port, that eased customs handling difficulties that local firms 
earlier faced. Such forms of joint action provide critical gains to the cluster, and suggest that local 
competition and local cooperation can coexist, albeit in tension, within the Sialkot cluster. 
 
4  Social identity categories in Sialkot 
My proposition is that local social networks provide key benefits which make it possible for Sialkot's 
surgical instruments cluster to function and compete in global markets. These include a policing 
system to regulate contracts, mediate competition and encourage cooperation in the cluster. As well as 
an information bank providing technical knowledge on the sector, on production and ways of doing, 
and personal knowledge regarding an individual's professional and social reputation and 
trustworthiness. Before exploring whether and how social networks influence the workings of the 
Sialkot cluster, this section identifies and details the dominant social identities in Sialkot.  
The identity categories that define community and influence social and economic behaviour in 
Pakistan's Punjab are multiple and interwoven; some overarching, others unique to specific groups. 
Among the former are common language and ethnicity (Punjabi) and religion (Islam).14 It has been 
argued that Islam and Punjabi ethnicity play a positive role in encouraging entrepreneurialism and 
supporting a culture of drive, hard work and thrift (Altaf 1983).15 While not discounting the effect of 
religion and ethnicity, I propose to focus on three interconnected identity categories which are 
subordinate to the overarching identity of a Punjabi Muslim. These are kinship group, family lineage, 
and 'localness'. Before proceeding to the pattern of social networks found in Sialkot's surgical 
instrument cluster, these identity categories need some explanation. 
 
Kinship 
There is no single, unitary, basis for kinship ties among Muslims in South Asia. In north-central India, 
non-corporate, socially hierarchical and often occupationally based zat identities are important  
                     
14 This is not to deny the presence of religious and ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, over 95 per cent of the local 
population is Muslim (Population Census: District Census Report of Sialkot; 1981), and religious influences are 
ever-present in Sialkot. Most entreprenuers I spoke to are openly religious. Attendance at Friday prayers by men 
is considered de rigeur, fasting in Ramzan strictly observed, and religiosity respected. In most firms, there is at 
least one Quoranic ayat (verse) framed on the walls. This, however, is not unique to Sialkot. It reflects the 
increasing influence of religion in daily life in Pakistan. 
15 This myth was incorporated into British colonial policy (Darling 1947, Gilmartin 1988). More recently, such 
stereotypes have become a central strand in nationalist discourses in Pakistan (A.S. Ahmed 1983, 1986).  
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(Ahmad 1978).16 Among the Pathans, kinship is primarily shaped on tribal lineage (Ahmed 1980; 
Barth 1959; Lindholm 1982). In central Punjab, however, biraderi, which literally translates as 
fraternity or brotherhood, is the key institution of kinship Alavi (1972, 1995). Alavi describes biraderi 
as the ‘basic unit of social organisation...[consisting of] a tightly knit corporate group which, 
typically, is subject to the authority of the biraderi panchayat (i.e. council)’ (Alavi 1995:  1).17  
Broadly speaking, and in sharp contrast to Hindu jati or sub-caste rules, the distinct forms of kinship 
among Muslims are endogamous, with a preference for parallel cousin marriages, and reflect aspects 
of both vertical and horizontal solidarity. Biraderi, while often an occupational category, is usually 
distinct from zat, the latter being a weaker and more diffuse concept in Punjab. Thus while zat lacks a 
corporate structure and is loosely organised internally, a biraderi can have fairly concrete and 
cohesive institutions for the expression and the enforcement of group interests. These are the rural 
biraderi panchayat (council) and the urban biraderi anjuman (society). The panchayat (or informal 
council of elders) enforces collective decisions on biraderi members. These include decisions 
regarding the arbitration of disputes within the biraderi, the allocation of common resources, choice 
of political and electoral alliances, and, ultimately, some control over marriage by adjudicating 
disputes over marriage claims.18 The panchayat also has the power to impose sanctions on its 
members.  
The ultimate sanction that a biraderi panchayat may impose on a household is to 'expel' it from 
the biraderi. When that happens those who are expelled become 'non-persons' in the society. 
They become vulnerable and disgraced. What is thought to be the most terrible aspect of such 
punishment is that the family cannot expect to be able to get spouses for its sons and daughters. 
This is not punishment that anyone wants to invite and as a result the authority of the biraderi 
panchayat is very great (Alavi 1995:  8).19 
                     
16 Zat among Muslims is often colloquially understood to have a close resemblance to the Hindu concept of 
caste in terms of social hierarchies. Nevertheless, while zat hierarchies are both symbolic (for example, who 
'sits' where in village society) and real (who can marry whom), they carry neither religious sanction nor notions 
of ritual purity associated with Hindu caste structures. For debate on the similarities and difference between 
Muslim zats and Hindu caste structures see Mandelbaum 1970:546-559, Alavi 1972, 1995, and the collection of 
papers in I. Ahmed, ed., 1978, and Fuller, ed., 1996.  
17 In contrast to the vast literature on caste in India (Mayer 1960, Mandelbaum 1970, Dumont 1970, Beteille 
1992, 1996, Fuller 1996), material on kinship, biraderi and social stratification in Pakistan's Punjab is sparse. 
Exceptions are village studies by Eglar (1960), Alavi (1971, 1972, 1973, 1995), and S. Ahmad (1977). 
18 According to Alavi (1995:8) ‘some biraderis regulate marriages more strictly than others. The degree of 
cohesion of biraderis appears to depend directly on their strictness in enforcing biraderi endogamy and, 
furthermore, in the ability of the biraderi panchayat in regulating marriages.’  
19 Alavi goes on to note, however, that biraderi expulsion is rare which, he implies, reflects the strong 
deterrence power of the sanction. 
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The influence of the panchayats, however, vary according to the economic status of the biraderi, the 
panchayat leadership and overall biraderi solidarity.20 In addition, in urban settings the corporate 
structure of biraderis become weaker as ‘the functions of kin groups begin to atrophy and the rules of 
kinship tend to weaken’ (ibid.:  28). Endogamy is less strictly enforced, common resources less 
clearly defined, and the power of the sanction of exclusion less effective. Nevertheless, even in the 
urban environment endogamy remains the preferred option.21 Residential housing patterns, 
particularly in small towns, often reflect biraderi concentrations and in some trades occupational 
biraderi identities retain some influence. More importantly, the urban biraderi anjuman despite its 
more restricted remit for enforcing collective decisions on biraderi members, exercises an importance 
influence in urban electoral politics.22  
Biraderi identities, therefore, can continue to have an important function in regulating social and 
political behaviour even in urban surroundings where kinship loyalties have begun to weaken.23 
Moreover, where individuals come together in sectorally specialised clusters, working in industries 
associated with traditional occupational groups, biraderi identities often overlap with economic and 
trade identities. In an earlier study (Nadvi 1990:  110), I observed that ansaris (the traditional biraderi 
of weavers) accounted for over 60 per cent of workers sampled in a cluster of small-scale textile 
weavers in Gujranwala. In such 'traditional' occupations biraderi continues to be important. It 
provides mechanisms for informal training, through inter-generational on-the-job apprenticeships, 
which are effectively restricted to biraderi members; gives access to information on the social and 
business reputation of individual agents; provides social collateral for informal credit; and, reinforces 
community identities via residential spaces that parallel biraderi and sector concentrations. 
 
Family 
If biraderi exerts some influence on social and economic relations in urban Punjab, the family is an 
equally important social and economic institution. The family in Punjab is a complex entity. It is not 
restricted to the nuclear household unit. Family as lineage incorporates both the immediate and the 
extended family. It is patriarchal and virilocal. Thus, as in much of the subcontinent, the common 
ideal is that of filial and fraternal solidarity, which prescribes that brothers should remain together in 
                     
20 For example, biraderi panchayats for rural landless labourers and sharecroppers acquiesce in decision making 
to the landlord for whom they work. Similarly, biraderis that are less stringent in enforcing endogamy are often 
weaker in enforcing collective decisions. 
21 Fisher's (1991) study on marriage patterns in urban Lahore suggests clearly that endogamy is sustained. 
However, he argues that the larger category of zat often substitutes for biraderi as the primary basis for kin 
identity. 
22 Gilmartin (1988:83) details how biraderi identity ‘served as a powerful idiom of horizontal political 
solidarity’ in urban Punjab during the colonial period, and how it acted as ‘response to the growth of 
communalism’. 
23 In a very different setting, Werbner's (1984, 1990) work on the Pakistani immigrant community in urban 
Britain shows the continued influence of kinship ties on entrepreneurship and business relations 
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the parental household after they marry, sharing equally in one purse and in common property, 
helping each other according to need and each giving according to his best abilities (Mandelbaum 
1970:  34).  
The 'ideal' joint and extended family is found in both rural and urban settings. Joint family units, 
however, tend to be weaker and less cohesive among the resource poor where income pressures and 
lack of space force married couples to move in search of employment or seek independent housing as 
their families grow. In contrast, for the wealthier and better endowed the extended family reflects 
status and provides economic benefits. Thus ‘among merchants and artisans the economies of scale of 
a large household are reasons for upholding joint families’ (ibid.:  54).  
The joint family as an 'ideal' institution is, of course, problematic. Internally the family is highly 
differentiated and vertically structured. Relations within the family, that is, between husbands and 
wives, fathers and sons, among brothers and so on, are rarely equitable. Power structures within the 
family are produced by, and reproduce, dominant social values and patriarchal attitudes. For example, 
the interests of women and of younger generations being subjugated to those of the family's male 
elders. Thus in a family firm, the management of the affairs of the firm, and to some extent the family 
unit as well, rests on adult, male family members under the overall authority of the male family head. 
Strong and 'harmonious' family relations not only provide a basis for mutual support and trust among 
family members, but also project to others in the community an image of reliability, probity and 
strength of the family as a whole. This enhances the social and economic reputation of the family.  
Moreover, in as much as the 'ideal' family is a gendered construction, so also is the notion of the 'ideal 
man'. Religiosity, family values, honesty, a reputation for hard work and for entrepreneurialism is also 
combined with the gendered role of the strong family man.Thus the reputation of the family is tied in 
with the reputation of its men - as the successful fathers and sons - and its women - as the compliant 
mothers, wives and daughters. 
Thus, the manner in which the family celebrates marriages, births and religious functions and mourns 
death within the family further reflect on its social standing. The family as a social unit is therefore 
constantly and systematically appraised in the eyes of the larger society, in which the family's 
reputation is shaped by, and shapes, its social and economic position. Where entrepreneurial families 
enter into economic ties with others, they not only trade in goods and services but also in social 
reputation and honour. This implies, as Bayly (1983:  377) suggests, a ‘dual role’, that of ‘a profit-
making enterprise and as a constellation of relationships through which [social] honour was acquired 
and conferred’.  
Marriage is a particularly important institution in which social and economic ambitions are brought 
together. Marriage implies a union between individuals and between families. The dominant practice 
of arranged marriages explicitly aims at building social and economic alliances between and within 
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families. This is clearly patriarchally structured. Marriage involves the giving and taking of women as 
a way of strengthening network allegiances, in both business and social realms. By viewing women as 
'objects of honour' for the family and the biraderi, the dominant patriarchy commodifies women 
whose marriage is not a reflection on them but on the honour (izzat) that it bestows on their families, 
and is reflected to the outside world (Fisher 1991). As Alavi (1995:  28) observes, marriage is about 
power relations. ‘Control over the circulation of women establishes social bases of power that is 
exercised over members of the kin groups by men who are in charge’ of the family and the kin.24 
Within this gendered framework, there are two distinct types of preferred marriage alliances:  between 
cousins, and marriages outside the extended family. Parallel cousin marriages ensure that property 
rights (and the business) do not leave the lineage through inheritance by women. Social and economic 
intra-family ties between siblings are seen as being strengthened through the inter-marriage of their 
children. In addition, such marriages suggest to outsiders a consolidation within the family and an 
image of solidarity. The motivation for marriages outside the extended family is that it provides an 
opportunity for improving social status. Marital alliances can be forged with families who have a 
higher social and economic status within the biraderi lineage, or with families in other lineages which 
rank socially higher. Such marriages not only signal the family's rise in status and rank, but also 
provide family members access to a wider circle of business and social contacts.  
Finally, it is important to note that families are not static in their structure or in the ways they behave. 
Family harmony is threatened by forces that strain bonds of solidarity and mutual support. These 
include internal divisions of age and gender. It also reflects a natural cycle in which, as families grow, 
they can also fracture. Divisions can arise from shortages of space, from intra-family disputes on the 
distribution of property and inheritance, and on decision making and authority structures. This can be 
especially important when families are also manufacturing units. The segmentation of the extended 
family into independent households often causes the family firm to split. Nevertheless, ties between 
immediate and extended family members are rarely totally severed. On the whole, family ties continue 
to provide a powerful network of contacts and of information. This can improve the ability of small 
producers to function in activities marked by imperfect information and uncertainty by providing 
access to collective resources, reputational association of the larger family and the pool of knowledge 
and information that family members hold and share with each other. 
 
                     
24 The reification of women, as the bearers of the family's collective honour, also provides the ideological 
legitimation for their seclusion from larger society through the practice of purdah, the veiling and exclusion of 
women and the gendered division of family and public space, which families adopt as they acquire social status 
and economic wealth. 
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Localness 
The notion of collective and shared information, essentially an informal social and economic data 
bank, provides the link to the third category of social identity. That is, social association formed by 
being 'located' within the local community or neighbourhood. Individuals do not need to be related by 
common lineage or kin ties to form social bonds with each other. These can, and are, developed over 
years of living and working together in a narrow and confined community space. These ties are 
reinforced by constant (often daily) interaction in the residential lane, in the local shops, in schools, in 
the tea-shops, in the local mosque and in the workplace. They are built over years, as children and as 
adults. They are cemented by the sharing of gifts at times of secular and religious celebrations, by 
participation at birth and wedding celebrations, and through the sharing of grief in funerals. Through 
such regular interaction a local social reputation is built up, which can act as valuable collateral in 
local economic and social transactions. Such ties are more specific, and imply more than simply 
community bonds. The term community being too broad to capture the notion of 'localness'. Biraderi, 
for example, can be a community identity. Localness implies being local, in a geographical, cultural 
and historical sense. If you are born and grew up in Sialkot, you do not necessarily have to continue to 
live their to be a Sialkoti.  
In the context of sectoral clusters, localness can also take on a cluster and sectoral dimension, creating 
a sector-specific notion of socialised relations. Social ties form through recurring contracts with 
agents, and information is shared across the cluster about the reliability and overall reputation of 
others. This is not dissimilar to the notion of 'earned' trust in business gaining primacy over socially 
'ascribed' trust (Schmitz 1995a). There is, however, a close connection between business and social 
ties. Trust, reputation and honour in business relationships are intertwined with the social relations 
that agents have with each other and their overall social standing. An individual's social standing 
impacts upon, and is itself impacted by, their professional reputation. For example, close business ties 
often develop into friendships. These are usually represented symbolically as family relationships. 
Thus for men, close male friends are accorded the honorific status of bhai (elder brother), their wives 
become bhabi (sister-in-law) and their parents chacha and khala (paternal uncle and maternal aunt). 
Incorporating close business ties and bonds of friendship into the network of family, strengthens 
personal ties and implies notions of trust, as well as access to the support associated with family 
kinship. 
What this section shows is that urban Punjabi society is a richly textured and multi-layered social 
environment. A number of cross-cutting social identities, from religion, ethnicity, biraderi, family and 
'localness', define individuals and influence their links with others. Biraderi, family and localness are 
particularly important. These categories can provide institutions of corporate regulation, are essential 
to the social reproduction of the community (closely influencing marriage ties), and to the location of 
an individual within the local regional and cultural space. Together they play an important part in 
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constructing the social reputation of an individual. Finally, it is noted that the social and the economic 
spheres cannot be disentangled from each other. In a small town environment, where most individuals 
are known and locatable within the complex array of interweaving social networks, productive and 
social life are inseparable. The next section explores how social identities and networks influence 
production relations in the Sialkot cluster.  
 
5  Economic relevance of social networks 
The previous section has shown that individual firms in Sialkot can be linked to each other through 
interconnecting social networks of biraderi kinship, family lineage and localness. Thus, most firms 
are families units, while the family is itself located in the biraderi kin group. Alongside family and 
biraderi there is also the social association, at the street, neighbourhood, even city level, of being 
local. In addition, close friendship bonds are often represented as symbolic family ties. At times these 
ties (among peers and within the biraderi) are cemented through marriage. Outside the cluster are 
foreign buyers who maintain direct business links with local producers. Often, links with outsiders 
take on a social aspect. Hence, all actors within the industry are known quantities, both professionally 
and socially.  
The relative weights attached to each of the three categories of biraderi, family and localness, and the 
strength associated with each type of social network in terms of a governance structure for regulating 
inter-firm behaviour, changes with time. Quantitative and qualitative data, including a questionnaire-
based sample survey of fifty-seven manufacturers and seventy-two subcontractors as well as detailed 
case studies and firm and family histories, was collected between November 1993 and June 1994. 
This is used to assess the relevance of these social categories to the organisational structure and 
functioning of the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster. To restate, our concern is with how these ties 
regulate inter-firm relations, and thus assisting local cooperation, and how they facilitate information 
flows, particularly in technical learning and marketing knowledge. 
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a) Biraderi 
The metal-based surgical instruments sector, by the very nature of its work, has traditionally been 
associated with the Lohar (literally ironsmiths) biraderi.25 Lohars in Punjab were historically a 
predominantly Muslim group26, who as village artisans provided a support function in rural 
communities by manufacturing and repairing agricultural and household implements, metal utensils, 
and occasionally weaponry, and by shoeing horses. They were considered village servants (kammis) 
who in return for their labour had a right to a share of the harvest. Lohars, like most kammis, rarely 
owned land and ranked low in the rural social order.27 This denoted their status in village society, 
imposed restrictions on which communities they could marry with, and often restricted whom they 
could eat and drink with. In terms of group solidarity, Lohars were traditionally in a weaker position 
compared with biraderis of cultivators. This was partly due to their relatively lower social status. 
Another factor was that Lohars, like other kammi groups, were geographically dispersed with no more 
than a few Lohar households in any given village. As a result, they lacked the tightly knit corporate 
structure and biraderi panchayats found among peasant cultivators and landowners.28  
Sialkot's surgical instruments sector began with the Lohars, and this biraderi monopolised the 
industry during its earlier years. With their traditional metalworking skills, Lohars fostered the 
sedimentation of specialised technical knowledge. This was critical at the early stage of the 
development and survival of the industry in Sialkot. They developed the codes, measures and 
standards for forging metals and shaping instruments. They also became trainers and teachers. 
Artisanal knowledge on the forging and shaping of surgical instruments was handed down among 
Lohars, from father to son through the generations. As production expanded more and more Lohars 
entered the industry, being employed as skilled workers with their biraderi kin members. Until 1947, 
there is no evidence of other biraderis being engaged in the manufacturing aspect of the industry, 
although local Hindus played an important role as traders.  
The exodus of the Hindu community in 1947 provided an opening for members of the Muslim Sheikh 
(trader) biraderi to enter the sector. As the sector grew, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, biraderis 
                     
25 In parts of Punjab Lohars are closely related to the kammi biraderi of Tarkhans or carpenters. According to 
Rose (1914:36) these two groups often formed a ‘single cast called Lohar-Tarkhan, and the son of a blacksmith 
will often take to carpentry and vice versa.’  
26 Rose (1914:36), using the census of 1883 and 1892, reports that 34 per cent of Lohars in (united, pre-
Partition) Punjab were Hindus and 8 per cent Sikhs. The Hindu Ramgarhia community is similar to the Muslim 
Lohars, with similar metalworking and carpentry skills, a reputation for being able to work to with their hands 
and for their entrepreneurialism. They feature prominently in the industrial success seen in East Punjab (see 
Tewari 1996). 
27 At the apex of the Muslim zat hierarchy are the Syed, or Shah and Qureishi (who claim descent from the 
Prophet or from his tribe the el-Qureish) and Sheikh (traders) zats. These are often referred to as the Ashraaf' 
(or nobility, those of historically foreign descent). They are followed by various landowning and cultivating zats 
(such as Maliks, Jats and Arains) many of whom converted from Hinduism. Hence a number of Muslim zats 
share the same name, and often similar social ranks, as certain Hindu castes (for example, Rajputs and Jats). At 
the lower rungs are the kammi zats, including carpenters (Tarkhans), blacksmiths (Lohars), and barbers (Nais).  
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not known for metalworking began to enter surgical instrument making in increasing numbers. Rising 
demand for Sialkot-made instruments led Lohars to turn to non-Lohars to satisfy the need for labour. 
Barriers to entry, based on knowledge and expertise of metalworking, were overcome as non-Lohars 
acquired technical training as apprentices in firms and stage units run by Lohars. 
Lohars continue to dominate Sialkot's surgical instrument sector in that they are the largest single 
biraderi group, and own and operate most of the oldest enterprises. They are the leading biraderi 
observed among sampled firms, accounting for 43 per cent of entrepreneurs in sampled final firms and 
32 per cent of owners of sampled subcontractors.29 A myth much propagated in Sialkot is that Lohars 
are the most skilful artisans in the trade. Many Lohar respondents assert that ‘we have it 
[metalworking skills] in our blood’, while others state that they are ‘good with their hands’.  
Despite the fact that Lohars are the leading biraderi in the sector, a number of other biraderis are also 
present. The fifty-seven surgical instrument manufacturers interviewed came from a total of eleven 
different biraderis. Among the seventy-two subcontractors sampled, sixteen biraderis other than 
Lohar were reported. Moreover, many of the larger and more successful manufacturing firms in 
Sialkot are owned and operated by members of the Sheikh (trader) and Arain (small cultivator) 
biraderis. With no prior occupational tradition in metalworking, they have acquired highly 
specialised, hands-on, technical skills in surgical instrument making. Arains, traditionally a small 
landowning and market gardening group with a reputation for hard work and entrepreneurship, are 
now a significant biraderi in the sector, accounting for approximately a quarter of sampled final firms 
and stage units.30 
Firms owned and operated by Lohars stand out from those run by other biraderi groups in that they 
tend to be older units, and are more likely to have a family tradition in the sector. Roughly three-
quarters of all Lohar firm owners interviewed consider surgical instrument making as the traditional 
family occupation, with their firm being second, third, or fourth generation units. In contrast, among 
non-Lohar firms, 63 per cent have no family tradition in this activity, and two-thirds are first 
generation units set up by the current owner.  
Being a Lohar, however, appears to provide no significant competitive advantage. Firms run by 
Lohars neither report higher sales, nor significantly different forms of production organisation from 
other biraderi groups. In fact, only 39 per cent of Lohar firms report a rising trend in profits over the  
                                                                
28 I am grateful to Hamza Alavi for pointing this out (personal communication: 9th August 1995). 
29 Of the 57 firms surveyed, four did not disclose their biraderi identity. 
30 Darling (1947:44) said of them: ‘for sheer ant-like industry there is no one in the Punjab to touch the Arain.’ 
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previous five years, compared to 53 per cent of non-Lohar firms. When asked whether being a Lohar 
is important for success in the industry all firms and subcontractors report negatively.  
Biraderi appears to play no part in providing an organisational framework for regulating vertical 
contracts. In terms of skilled labour, input suppliers or process subcontractors, firm owners do not 
deal exclusively with members of their own biraderi. Although biraderi background is generally 
known, it is not a factor on which confidence is built in inter-firm ties, or the capability of labour 
evaluated. Biraderi ties also appear to be insignificant at the level of multi-lateral horizontal 
cooperation, despite the horizontal solidarity implied in biraderi kinship. Annual elections for the 
leadership of the sector's trade association, although faction-ridden, are not decided on biraderi lines. 
Yet, biraderi ties are influential in the larger arena of local urban and regional politics (in which the 
Sheikh, Arain and Kashmiri biraderis were more important players than Lohars). Even here, however, 
other forms of local political allegiances are equally important.  
Biraderi identities do continue to play an important part in social relations in Sialkot, especially in 
terms of marriage ties. Biraderi endogamy still remains the dominant practice. In this regard, although 
being a Lohar is no longer a guarantee for success in the surgical instrument industry, an interesting 
finding is how social status among some of Sialkot's Lohar entrepreneurs has changed with the 
prosperity they have acquired by manufacturing and exporting surgical instruments. As mentioned 
earlier, Lohars traditionally ranked low in the social pecking order of Punjabi kin groups. However, as 
many Lohar families flourished and became part of Sialkot's economic and social elite, their kin 
identity also began to change.31 Wealth brought with it higher social status both in real and symbolic 
terms. Some respondents from leading medium and large enterprises in the cluster began to identify 
themselves as Mughals rather than Lohars. Mughals, who claim descent from Muslim invaders who 
came to South Asia from the fourteenth century onwards, and are thus one of the Ashraf, have a 
higher social status than Lohars.32 One key implication of this shift in social identity is that, as 
Mughals, it is socially more acceptable for these families to marry their offspring to members of other 
biraderi groups which, while keen to make a marriage alliance with wealthy entrepreneurial families, 
would find it socially difficult to marry Lohars.33  
                     
31 That is not to say that all Lohar families were successful or had grown from small to large enterprises over 
the years. In fact of the sample of firms that were small (employing less than 20 persons) roughly one-third 
were Lohar owned. 
32 Some of the ‘new’ Mughal families claim descent from sword smiths who came in the train of the Mongol 
armies and settled in the Sialkot area. Certainly during the sixteenth and seventeen century Wazirabad, a small 
town near Sialkot, was widely acknowledged as a leading centre for the manufacture of swords and other metal 
weaponry (Imperial Gazetteer of Punjab 1902). Rose (1914:130), however, notes a tendency in parts of the 
Punjab ‘for men of low caste to call themselves Mughal’ without any claim to Mughal ancestry. 
33 The view that Punjabi biraderi identities can change as the economic position of lineages alter over a number 
of generations has been observed by others, see Altaf 1983, Alavi 1995.  
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Although Lohars were critical to the cluster's initial formation and development, particularly as a 
repository of technical knowledge, they exert no direct influence today on patterns of inter-firm 
cooperation. In part, this reflects the limited power of kinship institutions (particularly biraderi 
anjumans) in enforcing economic exchange contracts in urban Sialkot, and the diffusion of 
metalworking skills among a wider group of non-Lohar artisans. Kinship-based social networks, 
however, do exist in Sialkot, especially at the level of social reproduction. If kinship does not fully 
account for the way in which productive relations develop within the cluster, in what ways do 
networks based on family lineage influence inter-firm ties?  
 
b) Family 
The family is a central economic and social institution in Sialkot. Most firms are family-run 
enterprises. Over half the sample state that all their adult (male) family members are directly engaged 
in the firm, either in managerial and supervisory tasks or in overseas marketing. For others, a large 
proportion of family members not directly involved in the sampled unit were, nevertheless, occupied 
in some capacity in the cluster - either with their own firms, sometimes as subcontractors or raw 
material suppliers. Thus of the fifty-seven firms interviewed, three-quarters report all male family 
members working in Sialkot's surgical instrument sector. This gives an indication of the pervasiveness 
of family in the cluster and suggests the influence of family bonds and relationships.  
Family ties affect intra- and inter-firm relations in the Sialkot cluster. Management in most enterprises 
is the responsibility of adult males in the immediate family, who often specialise in specific 
production, management or marketing tasks. Take for example Unique Surgical, a successful medium 
to large firm, employing thirty waged and seventy piece-rated contract workers, with exports of over 
US$ 0.5 million to the US and EU markets. The firm is headed by an elderly owner but effectively run 
by his four sons. The eldest son, based in Chicago, manages an independent US office that buys 
instruments from the parent firm to supply wholesalers and end-users in the US. Of the three 
remaining sons in Sialkot, the oldest is the firm's outward face. University educated, confident, 
intelligent and well travelled, he is the firm's link with its European buyer, handling marketing and 
undertaking trips abroad in search of contracts. He is considered the de facto head of the enterprise 
and key decisions are deferred to him. In exercising his authority he regularly consults his father and 
brothers, and occasionally the firm's full-time master craftsmen. The second son takes care of the 
administrative and managerial functions. The youngest, despite his youth (early twenties) and low 
level of formal schooling, is sufficiently skilled in the technical aspects of manufacture, with over ten 
years of experience and apprenticeship, to be responsible for day-to-day production. In some large 
firms, the distribution of tasks within the family (including members of the extended family) is even 
more sophisticated with family members specialising in quality control, handling stage units, and 
running specific product lines.  
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At the level of inter-firm ties, many of Sialkot's entrepreneurs, and thus firms, are related to each other 
through blood or marriage ties. This is most apparent in extended families which often support a 
number of separate production units. Some of these firms are independent of each other and 
technically compete. In others, ideas are shared and crises confronted together. In others, there are 
direct forms of production co-operation through the use of common facilities and resources. In certain 
instances, separate units run by different family members, while operating as distinct firms, are 
essentially part of the same industrial group. Take for example Diamond Surgicals, one of the largest, 
oldest and most successful firms in the cluster. The firm is an industrial group consisting of six 
separate companies each producing surgical instruments. The group is managed by three brothers and 
their sons. The group's combined annual turnover is around US$ 4 million and it employs more than 
200 workers. Founded in 1942, Diamond is a second generation off-spring of one of the pioneering 
firms of the cluster, Mughal Brothers, founded in 1902. In 1972, a fourth brother left Diamond to 
form his own firm, Global, which is now a successful medium-to large sized enterprise. Global is thus 
the third generation offshoot of the original firm, Mughal Brothers. 
Patterns of horizontal competition and cooperation within families vary. In the Diamond group there 
is close cooperation. Although each of its units are run as independent firms with separate production 
facilities and distinct buyers, they share common technical facilities (such as die-making and heat 
treatment), stocks of finished products and raw material, make joint purchases, and sometimes trade 
workers among the group. Most importantly, all six firms contribute to the group's overall financial 
position. In contrast, Diamond's relations with Global is less close. Global regularly uses Diamond's 
heat treatment facility and obtains surplus instruments as and when needed from the larger Diamond 
group. When asked about this the head of Diamond said: 
‘Well, he is my brother. If he needs something we will help out. He set up separately because he 
wanted to run his own show. That's fine by us. If any of my brothers or nephews within the group 
wants to follow a separate path they are free to do so, but we try to keep together’ (M. Moeed 13 
February 1994). 
However,certain types of information and technologies are not shared, even with siblings. Thus, Mr 
Moeed goes on to say about his brother: 
‘We do not share our marketing information with each other. He has his clients I have mine. I 
don't ask him his prices or how he does things and he doesn't ask me about mine. But of course 
we know what's going on... [and]... we will not let anyone touch our CNC [computer numerically 
controlled] machines when we get them. Not even my brother Kashif in Global will get access to 
it. In this business it is everyone for themselves’ (ibid., emphasis added). 
Diamond's ties with its 'parent' firm, Mughal Brothers, and the twenty-odd other off-shoots of Mughal 
Brothers is restricted largely to social and family ties. Although there is some discussion of common 
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problems and mutual support for each other's positions in the trade association, there is no direct 
production cooperation. The head of one large off-shoot of Moghul Brothers described extended 
family ties as follows: 
‘I am related to the Diamond group. My sister is married to Moeed, the head of Diamond, and he 
and I have the same great-grandfather so you could say we are the same family. But we do not 
discuss business with each other. Business is business and family is family. When we get 
together at family occasions, like marriages and birthdays and so on we don't talk shop. You see 
there is no real competition between us, we have our clients they have theirs and there is more 
than enough business to go around for all of us. So we are all happy’ (M. Sami 22 February 
1994). 
A few days after this interview, however, I revisited Mr Sami and found him with his cousin Faisal, 
the younger brother of Moeed and the quality control manager at Diamond, discussing specifically the 
reliability of a particular subcontractor, and more broadly how they were trying to conform with new 
quality control pressures facing the industry. This meeting suggested that discussions among extended 
family were common, not restricted to purely social occasions, nor solely to social and family issues. 
Yet, for many local actors, such discussions were often not considered as related to business - more a 
case of social banter. It is through such frequent exchanges, however, that much valuable information 
is shared.  
Take another case of loose cooperation across extended families. SurgiPak Instruments and Sialkot 
Surgical are two large firms, that are not only next-door neighbours on the industrial estate, but are 
also run by first cousins, who live in neighbouring houses in one of Sialkot's better suburbs. 
Originally part of one family-run unit that bifurcated in the mid-1950s, both firms are today managed 
by dynamic, young, university-educated individuals. Despite bonds of family and friendship, there is 
no formal co-operation between the two cousins. Each has his own forging unit, chemical cleaning 
plant and die-making facilities, and their own networks of subcontractors. Nevertheless, informal 
cooperation is common. The cousins share ideas and discuss matters relating to the industry with each 
other, help each other at times of crises, and support each other in trade bodies. In fact, the head of 
SurgiPak Instruments had lobbied hard to get his cousin successfully elected as President of the 
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry during the early 1990s. As far as competition is 
concerned, both cousins agree not to poach each other's clients and to inform the other if they hear of 
other firms attempting to do so. As the head of SurgiPak Instruments said: 
‘Both of us have large enough order books to keep us satisfied. Even if we wished to expand we 
would not be entering into direct competition with each other. In fact there is no competition as 
such between us. We know what each other does, we don't hide anything, but we also respect and 
support each other’ (S. Arif 7 May 1994) 
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Do family ties play a more important role in inter-firm relations among smaller enterprises? It would 
not be unreasonable to expect smaller firms, with their more limited resources, to be more dependent 
upon the extended family. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that family ties vary in inter and 
intra-firm relations for firms of different sizes. In fact, one example where sibling relations (or 
rivalries) could lead to friction, and possible breakdown, in intra- and inter-firm co-operation comes 
from an SME. This, relatively successful firm, Unimed Surgical, is run by the owner, Rashid, his 
three sons, and two sons-in-law. Although a family enterprise, there is a clear hierarchy in the roles 
allocated to sons and to sons-in-law. In particular, the latter are excluded from some managerial 
functions, and are not privy to information that Rashid considers critical to the firm. For example, 
Rashid would not let his sons-in-law have access to the specific technology (for making tungsten 
carbide tipped instruments) which gave his unit a unique advantage in his eyes. There is a clear 
tension here with the sons-in-law well aware of their lower status in the family. This is partly because 
they not only work for their father-in-law but also do not conform with virilocal practices, living with 
their wives' family and thus acquiring the lowly status of a ghar-damad (house or 'domesticated' son-
in-law). They are thus far from the gender ideal, in effect not 'real' men, and thus less likely to be 
trusted or respected.34 Intra-firm tensions are thus mixed with intra-family tension. 
Such tensions also enter into Rashid's relations with his two younger brothers, Riaz and Fayyaz, both 
of whom are also in the industry. Riaz, based in Germany, is a leading supplier to the EC market and 
sources from various firms in Sialkot. Fayyaz, the youngest brother, has his own firm in Sialkot that 
supplies solely to Riaz. Rashid also used to supply Riaz. There has been a falling out and Rashid 
refuses to have any dealings with Riaz despite the fact that this could provide his firm, which is 
searching new buyers, with a long-term orders.  
The basis of the conflict lies ostensibly in a dispute relating to business practices and the sale of sub-
standard material. As a result, Rashid, who prides himself as quality-conscious producer, has cut off 
all links with both younger brothers. This is a drastic action not only for its implications for the firm, 
but also for family relations. It is very likely that such an intra-family dispute has other, non-
production related, dimensions to it. The real reason may be far more complex. One possible factor 
relates to marriage and family ties. Marriage of children among the brothers is thought desirable and a 
sign of strengthening family ties. Within the practice of parallel cousin marriage ‘an elder brother has 
the highest ranking claim for his younger brother's daughter's marriage to his son’ (Alavi 1995:  8). 
Riaz, the wealthiest of the three brothers went against his elder brother's wishes by marrying his 
daughter to Fayyaz's son. Riaz's action was in effect a statement of power within the hierarchy of his 
brothers, power that came through his relatively better financial position. In doing so, Riaz, and  
                     
34 The gendered construction of the ideal man, and how that shapes the character and behaviour of Sialkot's 
entrepreneurs and their relationships to each other, clearly needs to be further explored. 
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Fayyaz for agreeing to it, diminished the social honour (izzat) of the eldest brother Rashid and 
lowered Rashid's standing in the eyes of the larger social community. This caused a breakdown in 
family relations. What this shows is that intra-family production linkages are prone to often brittle 
sibling rivalry. In a society where hierarchies are maintained within families, bonds of fraternal 
solidarity, that can potentially strengthen a firm's economic position, are themselves threatened by the 
differential economic developments of family members. 
With this experience in mind, Rashid has divided Unimed Surgical into a number of notionally 
independent enterprises registered separately in the names of each of his three sons. The primary 
reason for this is to ensure that, if there is a falling out between his sons, each would have a separate 
operating firm (i.e., with separate clients and order books) to build up independently. Nevertheless, 
Rashid deeply values cooperation between his sons. ‘For them to survive in the future, they have to 
stick together’ (Rashid 15 July 1994).  
While family ties are an important feature in horizontal ties, they are less significant in linkages 
between producers and their subcontractors and suppliers. Only seven firms (12 per cent of the 
sample) report family members running separate subcontracting units or working as suppliers to the 
cluster. Of these seven, six are small enterprises of which a number were themselves formerly 
subcontractors. The seventh is a medium-sized firm that helped set a poorer cousin up as 
electroplating subcontractor. Such assistance reflects a power relationship within the extended family. 
In contrast to horizontal relations between producers, ties between firms and their subcontractors are 
not only hierarchical in production, they are also socially hierarchical. They are often paternal in 
nature, with power very clearly vested in the firm. Similarly, such familial and paternal relations also 
apply to apprenticeship linkages. Teacher-apprentice (ustad-shagird) tend to be very close, being 
formed over a number of years of training. Thus many firm owners (particularly among small 
concerns and subcontractors), with apprenticeship ties to other firms, see their place of learning in 
much they same way as they would their parental home. As one respondent said ‘we learnt our skills 
working in Moghul, we continue to have the greatest respect for them, they are like our father in a 
way’.  
Sialkot's entrepreneurs are often related to each other, either directly through blood and marriage, or 
symbolically through the paternal links associated with apprenticeship. While the family usually 
constitutes the firm's internal management structure; family ties, both real and notional, also influence 
horizontal relations between firms in Sialkot's surgical instrument sector. Despite extensive local 
rivalry, there is a thick cord of family ties that bring competing producers together. These bonds are 
significant at a looser, but no less important, level of cooperation -such as sharing certain types of 
information, tackling common problems, taking common positions in the trade association, and in 
defining the limits of competition. Family ties are, however, less significant in vertical ties. Among 
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large and medium-scale firms it is more common for family members to set-up as 'independent' 
entrepreneurs, with their own surgical instrument manufacturing enterprises, than as independent 
suppliers or subcontractors. Social hierarchies clearly demarcate backward linkages. Yet social 
networks do operate at the level of vertical ties, particularly with suppliers and subcontractors? In 
these relationships both firms and subcontractors are most exposed to the threat of opportunism by the 
cooperating party. How can cheating be stopped, or at least be effectively policed? To answer this I 
turn to the third layer of Sialkot's social networks:  local reputation. 
 
c) Localness and Local Reputation  
Obligational, as opposed to arms-length, relationships in inter-firm ties are more easily built if firms 
deal with a few as opposed to many actors in each given process, if they know their suppliers, 
subcontractors and buyers well, if the relationship is cemented over time, and if there is extensive 
interaction between the two parties (Sako, 1992). Face-to-face relations, a history of repeat 
transactions, personalised and affective ties all serve to smoothen and strengthen vertical production 
ties. This leads to an element of economy:  search costs are lowered, a common code of understanding 
is built up of each party's working practices, their strengths and their weaknesses; all of which 
improve reliability; and enhances the scope for mutually-advantageous technical interaction.  
Such long-term association and familiarity is further supported by being part of a local community. 
Mutual dependency and trust by each party on the other, and a commitment to the relationship in the 
form of support, adaptability, flexibility and mutual learning, is underlined by social ties based on 
local connections. Localness can strengthen production ties through the provisioning of social and 
economic reputation. Reputation carries weight within the cluster. The credentials of an agent to 
undertake a task honestly and on time can be established through the local grapevine or social 
knowledge bank. Being local provides access to an informal collective social knowledge bank 
regarding the social and economic reputation of other agents within the cluster and the community. 
‘Knowing and being known’ locally, is a critical part of the social capital of the cluster where the 
costs of failure or default on the part of an interacting agent can be extremely high for the other 
partner.  
Being a local from Sialkot is considered essential for a manufacturing unit to survive in the cluster 
and compete internationally, reported by two-thirds of sampled firms. As one respondent said ‘In 
Sialkot everybody knows everybody. You know who they are, their family backgrounds, even the 
scandals linked to them. That is one of the advantage of this place because you know exactly who or 
what you are dealing with’ (B. Khan 29 January 1994). 
Few outsiders can survive in the surgical instrument cluster. Only one firm has no local roots. 
Kohinoor Surgical, is the exception that proves the rule that- 'only a Sialkoti can prosper in the 
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industry'. Part of a large Karachi-based, multi-sector, industrial group, Kohinoor located in Sialkot in 
order to enter the industry. The firm's holding company is non-Punjabi, although Kohinoor's senior 
management are Punjabis, albeit not from Sialkot. Not only has Kohinoor adopted similar 
manufacturing and organisational practices as found in other medium to large firms in the cluster, it 
has also had to become ‘Sialkoti’. As the General Manager emphatically stated 
‘even though I am not originally from this area, after living here for over 10 years, having built 
my house here, educated my children here, this is my home. I have no other home. I am a 
Sialkoti now. This is where I will live and this is where I will be buried.’ (S. Tariq 16 July 
1994 respondent's emphasis). 
It would be hard to find a clearer statement of being socially embedded. 
Kohinoor has been ‘accepted’ within the cluster. Its General Manager has acquired the attributes of 
what, in Sialkot, constitutes a good reputation:  honesty, hard work, quality-consciousness, timely 
payments, a hands-on involvement in production, and social and religious probity. A recognition of 
this is the fact that he has twice been elected to the governing council of the trade association. To get 
to this position, Kohinoor had to spend the first five years of its operation in Sialkot getting to know 
the system and familiarising itself with local suppliers and sub-contractors. As the General Manager 
explained ‘during that time there were many losses. We had to get to know the suppliers and the 
makers, who was reliable and who was not, and they had to get to know us and our business practice’ 
(ibid.). 
All but two subcontractors sampled are locals from the Sialkot area. Similarly, all workers employed 
by firms and by subcontractors are from Sialkot. What is critical about being a local is that if you are 
from the area then you are known and know others. A local can tap into the bank of social capital 
residing in the cluster. This provides the collateral necessary for local agents to enter into transactions 
with each other. Three-quarters of all firms sampled reported that they considered it important to their 
success that those with whom they are dealing were known well. Long term knowledge and repeat 
transactions are equally important. Of the firms sampled, two-thirds had known and dealt with their 
workers for over five years, 70 per cent had dealt with their input suppliers for over five years, and 72 
per cent had known and been selling to their buyers for over five years.  
Reputation is particularly important at the level of ties with subcontractors. Producers tend to deal 
with only a handful of subcontractors in any given process. This allows for strong, long-term 
relationships to be built-up. On average, subcontractors had been engaged by sampled firms for over a 
decade. Over 90 per cent of firms knew most, if not all, of their subcontractors well. Producers knew 
where subcontractors worked, their production facilities, the type of operation they ran, and had a 
good knowledge of their professional reputation as well as of their social and family backgrounds.  
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The importance of established ties with subcontractors is underlined by the elder brother of the 
management team in Unique Surgical, who pointed out that 
‘old makers [subcontractors] are reliable because they are known parties. New makers are only 
picked after careful selection, we have to get someone's references about new makers before we 
give them work. With old makers trust is very strong, they produce good quality work on time. 
They deliver’ (S. Ahmed 9 December 1993). 
On the whole, the relationship between manufacturers and subcontractors is reported as ‘close’ by 
both parties. Only 11 per cent of manufacturing firms described ties with subcontractors as purely 
commercial. Instead, for 62 per cent these ties are considered friendly, mutually co-operative and 
good. Some producers (a quarter of those sampled) even describe ties with subcontractors as fraternal 
and familial indicating an element of paternalism. This often occurs where subcontractors were former 
workers or apprentices of the client firm, or where the firm owner and subcontractor had previously 
worked together. A similar pattern emerges from the subcontractors' perspective, with two thirds of 
sampled stage units describing ties with manufacturers as friendly and good. Linkages between firms 
and subcontractors are thus far from anonymous and impersonal market based transactions - they are 
highly familiar and built over an extended period of working together.  
Behind the expressions of mutuality and closeness, it has to be remembered that relationships between 
subcontractors and parent firms are highly unequal, both economically and socially, the scales usually 
being balanced in favour of the latter. Firm owners rarely view subcontractors as social equals. 
Subcontractors, while they usually have direct access to the owner of their parent firm, rarely share 
the same social spaces. They tend not to live in the same areas, eat in the same restaurants and cafes, 
or send their children to the same school. Inter-marriage between these two economic groups, due to 
the differential wealth status, is unusual. Where there is social inter-mixing by subcontractors with 
local producers, it is found with owners of small firms, often enterprises which until recently were 
subcontracting units, or with those with whom earlier ties of friendship and working together exist.  
Thus, in most cases, there is a clear patron-client relationship between parent firms and their 
subcontractors. The latter are largely dependent on the continuing goodwill and support of the former 
in order to survive and prosper. Such ties are often reinforced by familial links built through periods 
of apprenticeship undertaken in the parent firm, and through the financial and technical support that 
parent firms provide to the subcontracting unit. Furthermore, close links with producer firms can help 
subcontractors access productive and non-productive resources. Parent firms often provide 
subcontractors with space and equipment on a rental basis. In such situations, while subcontractors are 
sometimes free to take on work for others, the parent firm always gets priority in such relations. 
Credit and cash advances are often provided by producers to subcontractors to cover costs of input 
and other materials, and occasionally to obtain equipment.  
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Another aspect of the patron-client dependency is seen in patterns of credit relationships. 
Subcontractors, having built a long-term relationship with a particular producer, often turn to that firm 
for consumption credit to meet costs of, for example, marriages, illnesses and health care. Such ties of 
patronage are reflected in the comments of an owner of one large firm: 
You see when they [the subcontractors] marry their daughters who else can they turn to but us 
[firm owners]. I help out by giving money to cover the costs of the wedding, and gifts and so on. 
You see, their daughters are also in some ways my daughters, so if I can then, God-willing, I will 
and I must help as if it is my own family. Look, they are also humans. You need to have a soft 
heart. After all, by helping them I know that they will respond when I ask them to get something 
done on time (M. Sami 22 February 1994). 
Close ties do not emerge in isolation. They are embedded in local social reputation. Reputation not 
only of the firm's and subcontractor's ability to deliver on schedule or its technical skills, but also of 
the standing of the firm owner (or the skilled artisan) within the community as a whole. Business 
transactions impact on social relations, and social relations on business relations. Thus although 
biraderi and family in their own rights do not appear to provide the institutional mechanisms for 
regulating vertical contractual relations, they are an aspect in the way in which firms view each other. 
A good reputation, both in social and economic, is a valuable asset. Information flows easily about the 
capabilities and capacities of the different actors within the cluster, lubricated by the thick oil of local 
ties. Social networks built around localness, long-term ties, reciprocal relations, and strengthened by 
knowledge of biraderi and family background, provide the mechanism for regulating contracts and 
sustaining production networks. The sanction to agents for breaking contracts is a loss of reputation, 
both economically and socially. In the narrow confines of the cluster, such a fall from grace become 
rapidly and widely known, threatening the prospects of further contracts.  
Nevertheless, local competition can push social ties to a point where they may break. As mentioned at 
the outset, rivalry is intense in the Sialkot cluster. This is especially so at the level of marketing. Price 
competition, various forms of local 'industrial espionage', and attempts to poach clients from each 
other is not uncommon. In response to such competition, extensive measures are taken by cluster-
based producers to restrict marketing and price information. The difficulty of suppressing information 
from local rivals is, for some firms, a disadvantage of being located in the cluster. Similarly, visits by 
local manufacturers to another firm's production facilities are frowned upon. As many respondents 
state ‘it is not the practice here to show the factory to others’. Where visits are allowed, they tend to 
be restricted to close friends or family, i.e., to those considered trustworthy.  
In spite of attempts to control information, knowledge flows freely in the cluster. For example, 
although Unimed Surgical claimed that it was one of only two firms in Sialkot producing TC tip 
instruments, I came across seven firms in my sample manufacturing similar instruments. Again, 
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exchange of technical knowledge is more pronounced among those with whom producers have close 
relations. As one respondent stated ‘normally we don't discuss things with each other, but if you are in 
good terms with somebody, then maybe, yes, you may share information’ (N. Amir 22 February 
1994). Information is shared between producers in business and social settings, from restaurants and 
offices to social gatherings. The nature of information varying from cluster gossip about how other 
producers are faring, to background information on sub-contractors, export information and trade 
practices abroad, and discussions on the effects of government policy.  
In summary, social networks, shaped around the distinct, and interwoven, identities of biraderi, 
family and being locally located, are clearly important to the manner in which the Sialkot surgical 
instrument cluster operates. Each of these social identity categories provide distinct forms of social 
capital, and serve to reinforce particular types of production relations. The concluding section 
discusses further how the basis of social networks have changed in Sialkot.  
 
6  Conclusion - The shifting basis of social networks 
The puzzle in the industrial district model is understanding how local competition co-exists with local 
cooperation. The argument put forward is that social networks can help explain this conundrum. 
Industrial districts are fertile ground for transaction costs, arising from information asymmetries, 
bounded rationality, and the fear of opportunistic behaviour. Networks provide one way in which such 
transaction costs can be mitigated. Network arrangements involve long-term and recurring ties in 
which agents project and protect their reputation for hard work, quality, and good business behaviour. 
Reciprocity and reputation are critical for production networks to function. Within the district, an 
agent's reputation is both economic and social, the one working on the other. Local social networks 
can deliver valuable social capital, consisting of both technical and personal knowledge of the 
industry as well as of the reputation of local firms, suppliers, traders, artisans and workers. Reputation 
influences with whom, and how, agents interact. It also implies high 'social exit costs', in the form of 
loss of reputation and social honour, for failing to meet contractual obligations. 
Social networks can also provide the conduits for the flow of socially embedded technical knowledge 
as well as reputational information on local agents. As Barr (1996) has noted networks that ensure 
regulation may not be best placed to encourage information flows. Social networks are also evolving, 
being changed by the very economic processes that they influence. However, social ties are often 
difficult to discern and measure. Furthermore, social embeddedness can enforce barriers to entry of 
new ideas, potentially weakening the ability of local actors to respond to exogenous developments, 
and can reinforce existing power asymmetries. 
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In the context of Sialkot, where local producers compete in high quality global markets, it is proposed 
that social networks help mediate the boundaries of acceptable competition and encourage local 
cooperation. Local joint action, which has resulted in cluster-wide benefits, has been central to the 
cluster's success. The discussion above has shown that social ties, at some level, are important to the 
way in which various agents relate to each other in the Sialkot cluster. It is also clear that the 
importance and effectiveness of the specific social identities relevant to production ties in the surgical 
instrument cluster, namely kinship, family and localness, are changing. Moreover, it is apparent that 
social ties do not always operate in a uniform and unidirectional fashion strengthening productive ties. 
Biraderi was central to the way in which the cluster developed, especially the manner in which 
knowledge of metalworking was transferred. The importance of biraderi, as a historically sedimented 
category defining social linkages within the cluster, and providing a bank of socialised technical and 
occupational knowledge, appears to have diminished with time. It continues to remain important, but 
mainly in the realm of social relations, especially in marriage ties. Families help explain how firms are 
organised, and often how they relate to each other. Family ties can account for varying degrees of 
loose inter-firm cooperation at the horizontal level. Nevertheless, family bonds are not always strong 
enough to ensure cooperation across and within firms, nor do they appear to influence ties between 
firms and their suppliers and subcontractors. Localness provides a key basis for reputational effects 
that regulate ties with subcontractors and suppliers as well as providing access to sector-specific 
technical knowledge. Being known by, and knowing others within, the community of surgical 
instrument firms is considered critical to survival in the cluster. It provides a material basis for social 
and business reputation. 'Knowing and being known' locally provides the basis for production 
networks to operate locally.  
Yet, even the bonds of being local may be vulnerable as the cluster develops and external actors (such 
as buyers and foreign producers), with whom local manufacturers share no social ties, gain influence. 
Sialkot's surgical instruments producers are increasingly facing pressures to adopt international 
quality control and assurance standards in order to retain a presence in the highly competitive high 
quality markets of the West. This requires changes. It is a more difficult task than simply acquiring 
new technologies. It implies reorganising production and acquiring a new quality-driven set of 
production values at each stage of production. External clients become a key information source, the 
eyes and ears on the international market, and the enforcer of quality control standards. This implies a 
need for stronger social bonds among agents with whom Sialkot's producers have no prior local 
experience. As with backward linkages, ties with buyers tend to be close and built over time. Long 
term recurring contracts have to be actively constructed and nurtured before trust can take shape. As 
ties form between producers and external agents they also take on a social dimension. This is 
captured, for example, in the friendship forged by the young head of SurgiPak Instruments and the 
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local (Sialkoti) representative of the US kit-packing firm Ameritrade. By building these social links, 
the owner of SurgiPak Instruments is keen to ensure that Ameritrade considers his difficulties 
favourably and helps him confront the new challenges. In a similar vein, the head of the small to 
medium sized firm, Unimed, considers one particular German buyer as his technical ‘guru’ for 
helping him acquire the technical know-how (not just the technology itself) to upgrade his product 
line. This is a long standing relationship, steeped in social respect and friendship bonds between the 
two parties. Even the joint venture partnerships with foreign firms which have emerged in Sialkot, or 
are currently being negotiated, also require a social aspect to cement them. Bonds of friendship and 
support, involving trips to each other's facilities, gift giving and extension of hospitality, have to be 
formed for partnerships across cultures and borders to succeed. This does not mean that local social 
networks, based on being local or being part of a family, are likely to disappear. It does suggest, 
however, that new ties with agents who lie outside of the cluster are likely to gain in importance both 
in production relations and socially. 
These observations appear to support Schmitz's (1995a, 1997) view that ties in local social networks 
shift from an ‘ascribed’ to an ‘earned’ basis. In Sialkot ties of kinship and family lineage, 
'gemeinschaft', are diminishing in importance while those based on long-term business transactions, 
especially with external agents, 'gesellschaft', are becoming more strategic. However, the Sialkot 
experience goes further and suggests that distinguishing between ascribed and earned in a sharply 
binary fashion, eludes two key, and interwoven, points. First, that there are important interconnections 
between earned and ascriptive ties. Second, that different ties provide different sets of ‘services’, and 
that the relative weights attached to these services change as the cluster evolves.  
What does this then mean? It means the following. Aspects of ascriptive ties and local social linkages 
remain important to inter- and intra-firm organisation within the cluster, even when earned ties are in 
ascendancy. Earned ties are supported and reinforced by ascriptive social relations, which in the case 
of Sialkot means that economic and business reputation is embedded in a social context, in an 
awareness of each agent's family and kin background. Thus, it is not just that 'business is business and 
family is family' in Sialkot, but that it is also a case of 'business is family and family is business'.  
The other point is that social networks are important, not in themselves, but in terms of what they do 
for production relations within the district. Different social ties provide different types of support to 
the production network. As suggested earlier, social networks merit study in the context of districts 
because they can potentially provide mechanisms for the regulation of inter-firm relations, and in their 
role of information banks that aid the process of local knowledge flows. At particular stages of the 
evolution of the district different aspects of these ‘services’ provided by social networks take primacy. 
For example, during earlier stages regulatory functions may well be more critical in that they provide 
the rules and codes for governing inter-firm relations. Once these have been inculcated into the 
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workings of the systems, or have been reinforced by contractual law and formal business practices, 
the emphasis may well shift within social networks to the flows of information. This is likely to 
become increasingly important in an environment where producers cater to demand driven global 
markets where access to up-to-date marketing information and technical know-how is increasingly 
necessary to sustain competitive edge. If that is the case the types of networks, and social ties, that aid 
the flow of such information will gain in importance within the cluster. One is beginning to see 
elements of this in the Sialkot cluster with the weight attached to ties with foreign buyers, ties that are 
increasingly being given a social content. Even within the cluster, social and productive ties that 
facilitate technical development, learning and information are of importance. This is especially so in 
an environment where market provisioning of information and technical know-how is weak.  
However, I would argue that this does not mean that social ties that reinforce regulatory mechanisms 
will atrophy in Sialkot. This brings us to the first point above, of interconnections. Regulatory 
functions remain important, and provide the basis for information flows, learning and knowledge 
development to take place. Whilst in the emerging production relations within the cluster, formal 
contractual obligations (and international law) will increasingly govern ties between local firms and 
their global partners, such ties will continue to have a social dimension to them. Furthermore, in the 
production relationships that firms will continue to have with other local agents within the cluster, 
socially reinforced and socially acquired reputational factors will continue to command a premium.  
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